Over time, the impact of both political and institutional factors on th rate of economic growth has received a lot of attention in the econom literature. Since Adam Smith (if not before) it has been observed tha economic performance depends in part on political and institutional factors. Unfortunately, attempts to discover how and under what con ditions such factors impinge on economic performance often did no progress beyond anecdote.1 It is only recently that more systematic attempts were undertaken to analyze the importance of political an institutional factors in explaining cross-country variances in eco nomic growth. For instance, many researchers have examined whethe the democratic character of national political procedures and institu tions can help explain cross-country differences in national develop ment. L. Sirowy and A. Inkeles reviewed 13 studies, all of which attempted to evaluate the economic consequences of variation in the democratic character of national political regimes. Sirowy and Inkeles conclude that the studies they considered present a very mixed and confusing picture with regard to the effect of democracy on economi growth. 2 The relationship between civil and political liberty, on the one hand, and economic growth, on the other, has also been the subject of much discussion. Two conflicting hypotheses have been advanced concerning the connection between economic growth and political freedom. Some economists argue that freedom fosters economic performance and hence economic growth; others pose that high growth rates require economic controls and reduced freedom. Four recent cross-section studies on economic growth have found evidence that lack of civil and political liberties is negatively correlated with economic growth. Recently, also the issue of political instability and eco growth has been investigated by a number of scholars. Most studies point to political instability as an important hindrance nomic growth, since political instability reduces the supply capital and labor. Investment is discouraged due to the incre of capital loss, and political turmoil causes capital flight a drain. Political unrest also hampers the establishment of rights, which are necessary in order to realize productivity g ciated with impersonal exchange.
In his cross-section model for 98 countries for 1960-85 Barro included two variables to measure political instability: the number of revolutions and coups per year and the number, per million population, of political assassinations per year. He interprets these variables as adverse influences on property rights and finds that both variables exert a significant negative influence on economic growth. A. K. Fosu examined the importance of political instability from 1960 to 1986 for 31 sub-Saharan African countries. He also concludes that political instability has, on average, a deleterious impact on economic growth.6
It is very surprising that most studies reviewed so far do not differentiate between different groups of countries. The first purpose of this article is to examine whether empirical relationships between political instability and political freedom-as measured globally by most other researchers-are also valid for smaller geographic areas. The second purpose is to analyze whether results of previous estimates are sensitive with respect to the definition of measures for political instability and freedom. We examine a sample of 97 countries from 1963 to 1988 to determine whether lack of political stability and lack of political freedom are negatively correlated with economic growth. We find some evidence that lack of political stability affects economic growth in Africa. However, this finding is not robust, since other measures of political instability alter this outcome quite dramatically. There is some evidence that in Latin America political repression is negatively correlated with economic development. However, we show that this conclu- The article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the model and our data. Section III presents estimation results concerning the relationship between political instability and economic growth. Section IV contains our findings with respect to the impact of political freedom.
In this section we also address Barro's finding that when political instability and political freedom are simultaneously introduced into a growth regression, the civil liberties measure loses its significance. Finally, Section V summarizes the article and presents suggestions for future research.
II. Our Model and the Data
We have estimated variants of the following cross-section equation Q = ao + a, L + a2K + a3P+v, (1) where Q, L, and K are the average growth rates of r tion, and capital, respectively, and P is a measure of p or lack of political freedom and v is the error term. T and a2 are expected to be positive, while most previo suggest that a3 will prove to be negative.
For the period 1963-88 we have constructed a countries. This sample excludes the major oil-expo Political Handbook of the World. 12 Gastil has constructed two measures of freedom: civil liber political liberty. The civil rights rankings purport to measure the of the individual (e.g., independence of the judiciary and fre the press). The political rights rankings are based on the deg which individuals in a state have control over those who gove measure is based on issues like freedom of the electoral proces ence of intimidating violence, and the presence of an effective tion. The index runs from one (most free) to seven (least fre both measures of freedom are highly correlated, in Section IV report the regression outcomes using dummy variables that a on Gastil's political rights index. The dummy DPRI3 is on average of Gastil's political rights index for the period 1973-86 or higher and it is zero otherwise. For the dummy DPRI4 the of four is used as a cutoff point. By using two dummies we to investigate the sensitivity of our results for alternative tra tions. In Section IV we show that the outcomes are indeed sensitive with respect to the construction of the political rights dummy.13 Table 1 summarizes our data. It is interesting to note that the variance of our political instability measure is very similar for the various groups of countries that we examine. Except perhaps for Africa, this also holds true for our measures of political freedom. The lower part of table 1 shows the partial correlation between our measures for political instability and political freedom. It follows that this correlation is quite low.
III. Political Instability and Economic Growth
Before estimating the model, we first have to deal with a problem that was identified by Kormendi and Meguire.14 They argue that if the political-institutional variable affects economic development solely through the investment ratio, inclusion of capital growth should remove its effect. Therefore, we followed Kormendi and Meguire by excluding investment in estimating the model. As suggested by these authors, we also estimated simple models for the IIR. The IIR estimation results are reported in the second part of this section.
Row la of table 2 presents the estimation results of equation (1) for our total sample of 97 countries, using TRNS as a measure of political instability. The standard errors for the coefficients are based on H. White's heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.15 Most coefficients are significant at the 10% level or more. The coefficient of the political instability variable is negative, but not very significantly so. Excluding investment increases its significance only slightly (row I b).
We also estimated the model for three different continents: Africa, Latin America, and Asia. In Africa political instability appears as a very important factor in determining economic growth (rows 2a and 2b of table 2). Fosu also found for his sample of 31 sub-Saharan African NOTE.-The model estimated is IIR = a, + a2 TRNS + e.
Standard errors of the regression (SEE) are shown in parentheses. * Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed). NOTE.-The model estimated is eq. (1), usin dom. Standard errors of the regression (SEE) * Significant at the .05 level (one-tailed). ** Significant at the .10 level (one-tailed).
ever, their results were highly depen vestment-income ratio, suggesting th growth operates through the investm ment is left out, both the coefficien increase, although the coefficient rem suggests that political repression may its influence on capital formation. Be dence that supports this hypothesis. Rows 2-4 of table 4 show the resu and Asia, respectively. It follows tha for our total sample, the coefficient and significantly different from zer investment is excluded, the magn hardly change. Note, however, that is positive and significantly different f To examine whether our findings are sensitive with the construction of our political freedom dummy, we equations in tables 4 and 5, using a dummy (DPRI4) bas In conclusion, we find little support for the view that po repression negatively affects economic growth in our regiona Only in Latin America is there some evidence that political re hampers economic growth, but this conclusion is very sensit respect to the construction of the political repression variable political repression is positively associated with economic Again, there are marked differences in the results for the entire of countries and those for various smaller geographic areas.
V. Summary and Suggestions for Future Research
This article has three purposes: first, to examine whether the e relationship between political instability and political freedom nomic growth, generally measured with global data, also hold smaller geographic areas; second, to analyze whether estimat sults are sensitive with respect to the delineation of measures for cal instability and freedom; and third, to investigate the relat between political stability and political freedom and capital fo in order to determine whether the political-institutional variable a economic development through the investment ratio.
Using data for a sample of 97 countries for the period 1963 examined whether lack of political stability and lack of politic dom are negatively correlated with economic growth. We estim cross-section model based on a simple neoclassical production tion. Our measures of political instability are based on the total of government changes. Two dummies based on Gastil's politica index are used to measure political freedom. A first conclusion results for various regional groups of countries are often very dif We find that only in Africa is there mixed support for the v political instability reduces economic growth, both direct through its effect on capital growth. However, the results in the equation for Africa are rather sensitive with respect to the defini the political instability measure. In Asia there is evidence that instability hampers investment. There is also some mixed ev that political repression reduces economic growth in Latin A this result, however, is highly dependent on the constructio political repression variable. Political repression and growth a tively associated in Asia.
An important issue that is not addressed in this article is ca Following recent literature, we have based our estimates on t sumption that political instability and repression may hampe Rapid economic growth, whatever the nature of must involve fast and deep changes in the ways t the places that things are done, and in the dist prestige. Most people spend such a large proporti ing for a living and draw such a large part of t political influence from their economic position t nomic order must have great effects on other f fore, until further research is done, the presump economic growth, far from being the source of do it is sometimes supposed to be, is rather a disrup force that leads to political instability.8
It is clear that the results reported here do not since if there is any significant correlation at growth rates and political instability. However disappointing growth performance leads to poli ture research this issue should be addressed.
In this article we have used a very simple growth model to examine the impact of political instability and lack of freedom on economic growth. Further research is needed in which more elaborate growth and investment models are used to examine the robustness of our findings. Notes * We would like to thank C. A. de Kam and the editor and two referees of this journal for their helpful comments on a previous version of this article.
